Abstract-Efficient schemes for warning message dissemination in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) use context information collected by vehicles about their neighbor nodes to guide the dissemination process. Based on this information, vehicles autonomously decide whether they are the most appropriate forwarding nodes. These schemes maximize their performance when all the vehicles advertise correct information about their positions, but position errors may drastically reduce the performance of the dissemination process. We present a proactive cooperative neighbor position verification protocol that detects nodes advertising false locations and selects optimal forwarders to mitigate the impact of adversarial users. We combine our mechanism with two warning dissemination schemes for VANETs and demonstrate how the latter can benefit from the use of our security scheme in the presence of malicious nodes trying to exploit known system vulnerabilities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
V EHICULAR ad hoc networks (VANETs) are wireless networks that require no fixed infrastructure and are considered essential for cooperative applications among cars on the road [1] , [2] . VANETs are usually classified as a subset of mobile ad hoc networks, but they present some distinctive characteristics such as 1) road-constrained high- M. Fogue, F. J. Martinez, and P. Garrido are with the University of Zaragoza, 50009 Zaragoza, Spain (e-mail: mfogue@unizar.es; f.martinez@unizar.es; piedad@unizar.es).
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speed mobility leading to rapidly variable network topologies, 2) challenging RF signal propagation conditions, 3) no significant power constraints, and 4) very large network scales involving up to hundreds of vehicles. VANETs have many possible applications, ranging from road safety through cooperative awareness to real-time distributed traffic management. In this paper, we focus on traffic safety and efficient warning message dissemination, where the most critical goal is to reduce the latency while ensuring the accuracy of the information when a dangerous situation occurs. There, vehicles detecting abnormal situations (accident, slippery road, etc.) are deemed to notify the anomaly to nearby vehicles that could face the same problem later on. This is achieved through multihop forwarding, where location information is the key to deciding whether to rebroadcast an incoming warning message or not. Therefore, context information on car positioning is paramount to the correct operation of the system. However, most warning message dissemination schemes assume that all the information shared between vehicles is accurate; thus, location errors due to a positioning malfunction or attacks can seriously affect performance [3] .
In this paper, we propose a cooperative neighbor position verification (CNPV) protocol based on a proactive approach. Our scheme allows securing warning dissemination protocols in adversarial environments where advertised positions are not always accurate. We evaluate the effectiveness of CNPV on the performance of two of the most efficient-yet insecuredissemination algorithms developed for VANETs. Our mechanism is fully distributed, and combined with dissemination algorithms that require position information from communication neighbors, it allows detecting malicious vehicles announcing false positions, which should not be considered for the forwarding of critical information. As a result, CNPV improves the performance of the dissemination process in adversarial environments of up to 50% in terms of warning notification time and percentage of uninformed nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related work on neighbor position localization and verification and using context information to improve warning message dissemination in VANETs. Section III presents our proactive neighbor position verification algorithm. Section IV details the simulation environment used for the performance evaluation, whose results are presented and discussed in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Here, we first review existing proposals for the localization and position verification of communication neighbors. We then show how current schemes for warning message dissemination use context information to improve performance.
A. Neighbor Localization and Verification
As detailed in [4] , determining neighbor location in a wireless network is performed using positioning and verification of the position. The positioning process allows computing the position of a neighbor after collecting the information sent by other nodes. The verification of the position determines if the computed location matches the true position of the node.
Regarding positioning, self-localization can be performed through Global Navigation Satellite Systems [5] . Own position information can then be announced to nearby vehicles using vehicle-to-vehicle dedicated short-range communication. In addition, different existing methods can be combined to find out the neighbors within communication range. A distance bounding technique is described in [6] , which leverages the fact that each node has a limited wireless communication range. In our case study, we will rely on time of flight (ToF) measurements of the difference between message transmission and reception times [7] .
Once a node knows the positions of its neighbors, it must ensure that the advertised positions correspond to the true geographic coordinates, i.e., it must perform location verification. In the existing literature, we can find several mechanisms for infrastructured or hybrid networks: These provide solutions to secure localization using fixed or mobile nodes securely connected to the certification authority [8] , or through multilateration methods based on ranging and time difference of arrival [9] . The multilateration is based on the difference of the reception time of a message among a plurality of nodes. Indeed, if a source sends a message, the neighbors will receive it at different times, depending on their distance from the transmitter. By sharing information, we can deduce the location of the transmitter. Multilateration systems are widespread nowadays, and they are used by GPS and even airports to check the positions of the planes [10] .
As far as ad-hoc-oriented location verfication protocols are concerned, secure position verification systems for VANETs are presented in [7] , [11] , and [12] . In particular, [11] presents a complete taxonomy of position verification techniques and compares them via simulation under a simple noncolluder attacker model. The work in [7] applies a simple multilateration involving two nodes only; thus, it is not resistant to colluding and Sybil attacks. Our proposal instead can counter such attacks since it exploits the cooperation of all available neighbors through the cross-symmetry test and a more robust multilateration. In [12] , Fiore et al. proposed a distributed neighbor position verification mechanism for wireless networks. This protocol is designed to be reactive, i.e., a node called verifier must start the process at a given time to discover and verify the position of its communication neighbors. However, a high number of messages are required by this reactive protocol, thereby imposing a high channel overhead. In addition, there can be an important delay between the beginning of the process and the verification of neighbor positions. If all the nodes forwarding warning messages start this process upon reception of a warning message, the accumulated delay may be very significant, and the efficiency of the dissemination process would decrease. Hence, using reactive approaches is not appropriate for networks where nodes need to be constantly aware of the position of their neighbors.
B. Warning Message Dissemination
Dissemination schemes are commonly used in VANETs for critical applications. Among the existing mechanisms to improve warning message dissemination in VANETs, two of the most recent and effective algorithms are the enhanced Message Dissemination based on Roadmaps (eMDR) [13] and the Urban Vehicular broadCAST (UV-CAST) [14] . These protocols make use of information about neighbor vehicle positions to decide whether to rebroadcast the message or not and to determine if the vehicle is the most appropriate one to store the message for future forwarding.
The main objective of the eMDR scheme consists in using the information about the road layout and the position of the vehicles to select the most suitable vehicle to forward a message to reach as many vehicles as possible in the shortest time. In eMDR, a vehicle must decide if it should rebroadcast a received message depending on two factors: 1) distance between sender and receiver that a vehicle will forward the message if it is far enough from the source of the message to provide additional coverage area and 2) position of the vehicles in the roadmap due to the effect of buildings and other urban obstacles on radio signal at the frequency of 5.9 GHz used by the IEEE 802.11p standard for VANETs [15] . To reduce the number of produced messages, only the vehicle closest to the geographic center of the junction, which is obtained from integrated GPS maps, is allowed to forward the message. Fig. 1 indicates the minimum distance to allow rebroadcasting messages, and th j is the threshold used to determine when a vehicle is close enough to a junction. The highlighted operation represents the step of the algorithm where the information collected from the neighbors is used.
The UV-CAST algorithm selects different mechanisms for message dissemination in VANETs differentiating between well-connected and disconnected network regimes, depending on the density of vehicles in the vicinity. Each vehicle uses only local information to decide the network regime to which it belongs. Vehicles in the well-connected regime rebroadcast incoming messages after a wait time if no redundant messages are received. Vehicles in the disconnected regime must decide if they are suitable for the store-carry-forward (SCF) task, forwarding the message whenever they meet new neighbors. The SCF task is assigned to vehicles that have small expected time before they see new neighbors, which is obtained as the boundary vehicles of the neighbors in communication range, i.e., located on the vertices of the boundary polygon. The boundary polygon can be defined as the convex hull including the points representing the positions of the vehicles in communication range from the sender; hence, the boundary vehicles will be those located in the vertices of this convex hull, represented as shadowed polygons in Fig. 2 . The angles between the receiver vehicles, the source of the message, and each of the neighbors is computed, and the highest and lowest values are used to determine if the vehicle is boundary by means of the gift-wrapping algorithm. As shown in Fig. 2 , after vehicle A receives a message from sender S, it obtains the highest and lowest angle values with respect to its neighbors (θ + and θ _ , respectively). If |θ + | + |θ _ | > π, the vehicle is not selected for the SCF task.
Both eMDR and UV-CAST are designed to blindly trust the information provided by other vehicles. Vehicles may announce incorrect positions due to several factors: unintentional inaccuracies, e.g., GPS errors in poorly covered areas; however, malicious vehicles can also advertise an incorrect position to decrease the performance of a system or to gain advantage among peers, for example, by attracting traffic to a specific area. Hence, the information provided by other vehicles should be verified before being trusted and used as an input to dissemination algorithms. To this end, we design CNPV, which is a protocol that proactively determines which neighbors are advertising false information about their positions.
III. COOPERATIVE NEIGHBOR POSITION VERIFICATION PROTOCOL
We first introduce our reference communication environment and then detail the CNPV protocol we propose.
A. System Model
We consider a VANET where the communication neighbors of a vehicle are all the nodes that it can reach directly when transmitting. All vehicles are synchronized to a common time reference, and we assume that each node is able to determine its own geographical position with a maximum error p . Both criteria regarding timing and geographical position can be fulfilled by equipping vehicles with GPS receivers, which is a plausible assumption given the rapid diffusion of this technology in the automotive industry.
In addition, vehicles are capable of performing ToF-based radio frequency (RF) ranging with a maximum error equal to r . To retrieve the exact transmission and reception time instants, avoiding the unpredictable latencies introduced by interrupts triggered at the driver level of RF interfaces, a solution such as that implemented in [16] should be adopted. This implies a timing precision of about 23 ns, i.e., an average error of 6.8 m, determined by the 44-MHz clock of standard 802.11a/b/g cards. Furthermore, the GPS receiver should be integrated in the 802.11 cards; software-defined radio solutions integrating GPS in 802.11 are proposed, among others, in [17] and [18] .
Each vehicle X has a unique identifier, as well as a longterm private key k X and a long-term public key K X , to encrypt and decrypt data [19] . The node identity can be a permanent identifier or a temporary pseudonym to ensure user privacy [20] . Additionally, vehicles have a set of one-time use keys available {k X , K X }, and they can produce digital signatures (SigX) with their private key. We assume that the correspondence between X and K X can be validated by any node, as in state-of-the-art secure communication architectures exploiting the presence of a public key infrastructure (i.e., certification authority) [21] .
Vehicles are correct if they comply with the verification protocol, or adversarial if they deviate from it. Adversaries can be considered either internal or external to the network, depending on whether they have a set of recognized cryptographic keys or not. External adversaries have fewer opportunities to thwart the system; in fact, they can only serve as relay nodes since messages with unrecognized signatures will be immediately rejected by the rest of the nodes. Hence, we only consider the more challenging case of internal adversaries.
B. CNPV Protocol Objectives
The CNPV protocol is proactive, as each node participating in the system periodically sends its location and the information necessary for the protocol operation, similar to other existing routing protocols [22] , [23] . Hence, our approach is proactive in the sense that node messages are not the result of explicit queries.
The proposed protocol is designed to attain two main objectives in a mobile environment: 1) acquiring the positions of the neighbors and 2) verifying the correctness of these positions. The system is designed to allow each node to decide whether the positions advertised by its neighbors are accurate or not. Thus, a node assigns one of three possible states to each of its neighboring nodes.
• Verified: The advertised position corresponds to the true geographic position of the neighbor.
• Faulty: The advertised position does not correspond to the true position of the neighbor, which is tagged as an attacker.
• Unverifiable: The information collected so far is not enough to determine the correctness of the advertised position.
The CNPV protocol is based on a cooperative approach that takes advantage of the broadcast nature of the wireless medium and allows each node to verify the positions of its communication neighbors through the messages it receives. We remark that the position validation is run by each node independently and that CNPV does not require any exchange of the resulting neighbor states among nodes. Thus, the protocol does not require nodes to have global knowledge of the network or to find a global consensus on the verification of claimed positions.
C. CNPV Protocol Message Exchange
The proactive verification process uses a message exchange mechanism that takes place in two rounds with the same duration T round as follows.
• Round 1: In the first round, each node X participating in the protocol chooses a random time t X (not exceeding the round interval). At t X , the node sends an anonymous HELLO message, using a freshly generated MAC address and including 1) the node public one-time use key K X and 2) a pair of values for each neighbor from which X has received a HELLO in this round. Specifically, the pair of values referring to neighbor Y contains Y 's public onetime use key K Y and the time instant at which X received Y 's HELLO (denoted by t Y X ). The HELLO message is received by all the neighbors of X, possibly at a different time instant for each node. • Round 2: After a constant guard time denoted by T guard , nodes execute the second round of the protocol. Each node X sends a new message, named DISCLOSURE, at time t X . DISCLOSURE messages are sent following the same order at which the HELLOs were transmitted by the nodes, i.e., for each node X, t X = t X + T round + T guard . The DISCLOSURE message sent by node X contains i) the identity of the sender, ID X ; ii) its announced position, p x ; iii) the time at which it sent the HELLO message, t X ; iv) a pair of values (K Y , t XY ) for each neighbor Y whose HELLO was received by X after t X ; v) the information needed to make the correspondence with the HELLO message that X anonymously sent during the first round. Such information consists of the public one-time use key X transmitted in the first round, i.e., K X , and of this same value encrypted with X's private one-time use key k X (i.e.,
, whereas the latter lets X prove to its neighbors that it is the sender of both the HELLO and the DISCLOSURE messages it transmitted; vi) X's long-term public key K X ; vii) the digital signature of the DISCLOSURE message generated using X's long-term private key Sig X .
The protocol and the message exchange routine are presented in Fig. 3 and Algorithm 1. Note that, in Algorithm 1, N X denotes the set of neighbors of node X. Furthermore, we remark that during Round 1, a node X keeps recording the pair of values c Y for all neighbors from which it receives a HELLO message, even after having sent its own HELLO.
After the message exchange routine is complete, each node can create the correspondences between the messages sent in the first round and the neighbors that have revealed their identity (or pseudoidentity) in Round 2. Moreover, each node retrieves from the DISCLOSURE messages the transmission times (t X ) of the HELLOs for each of its neighbors. Such information, together with the locally stored reception times of the HELLOs, allows each node to use ToF-based RF ranging to calculate the distance that separates them from their neighbors. Packets received during the second round without a reference from the first round cannot be verified; hence, they are ignored until a complete packet interchange is performed.
For example, let us consider the case of a node Y receiving a message from X. Y retrieves t X , the transmission time of HELLO sent by X, from X's DISCLOSURE message. Y has locally stored t XY , i.e., the time at which it received the same message. Using this information, Y can determine the distance that separates it from X. Finally, we remark that the HELLO message in Round 1 needs to be anonymous to make the protocol robust to attacks. Indeed, if an adversary knew the postion of the nodes taking part in Round 1, it could use this information to adjust the timing data it includes in its own HELLO in Round 1. To make the HELLO in Round 1 anonymous, the message 1) is transmitted employing a fresh software-generated MAC address and 2) contains a public key K X taken from X's pool of anonymous one-time use keys that do not allow neighbors to map the key onto a specific node. Since a source address has to be included in the MAC-layer header of the message, a fresh softwaregenerated MAC address is needed; note that this is considered a part of emerging cooperative systems [20] . Including a onetime key in the HELLO also ensures that the message is fresh (i.e., the key acts as a nonce).
D. CNPV Protocol Verification Algorithm
Once the message exchange is finished, it is time for the participating nodes to verify the positions advertised by their neighbors. To this end, three tests are subsequently carried out by each of the nodes, allowing them to determine if the positions advertised are accurate or not. A more detailed description of such tests, as well as a mathematical analysis laying the foundations of the secure positioning scheme of CNPV, are available in [12] .
Three tests are performed for position verification: the Direct Symmetry test, the Cross-Symmetry test, and the Multilateration test. After running the three tests for each communication neighbor, each vehicle is able to determine if the interchanged information is trustworthy; hence, the neighbor may be considered as a potential forwarding node, or it may be considered malicious, in which case, the neighbor is considered as faulty and not suitable to rebroadcast the message. Next, we present the three different tests.
1) Direct Symmetry (DS Test):
During this test, the verifier node compares its own information to the information collected from each of its neighbors. This test does not use the cooperative approach of the protocol. During this test, two subtests are performed: 1) a coherence test, where the distance calculated using the ToF of radio signal must be coherent with the position announced by the neighbor; and 2) a signal range test, where the calculated distance must be less than the maximum range of the RF communication system.
2) Cross-Symmetry (CS Test):
Unlike the DS test, the CrossSymmetry test exploits the collaborative behavior of our approach by performing cross checks. The purpose is to verify the collected information from the neighbors that are mutually interconnected. The CS test ignores the nodes already considered incorrect by the DS test and compares pairs of nodes such that the two nodes and the verifier node are within communication range. When nodes meet these conditions, they are tested using the same criteria as in the DS test. The algorithm works by counting the number of links considered correct and the number of links considered incorrect. The ratio of invalid links with respect to the total number of links for a given node allows determining if its advertised position is trustworthy. With a ratio limit set to 50%, the majority value is considered. A smaller ratio limit will provide greater security, but it limits the number of links correctly verified.
3) Multilateration (ML Test): The last of the three proposed tests is applied to previously verified nodes. We want to detect suspicious situations where nodes have deliberately neglected to announce the links they have with other nodes by counting the number of neighbors who reported a link not announced by the suspicious node. If there are at least two, then we can compute-for each pair of nodes including a verifier S and a neighbor Y -a curve in which node X is present. If we can calculate two or more curves, node X is located at the intersection of these curves, which, due to their geometrical construction, are hyperbolas. GPS and ToF-based RF ranging error may lead to curves that do not perfectly intersect in one point. Thus, the centroid of such (closely located) intersections is determined and then compared with the distance advertised by the suspicious node. If the error threshold is exceeded, the node is considered invalid. In our simulations, the error threshold is set to 10 m.
IV. SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT
We evaluate the impact of the CNPV protocol on eMDR and UV-CAST, which are two state-of-the-art warning message dissemination algorithms.
Since deploying and testing VANETs is unpractical due to high economic costs and system complexity, we resort to simulation as a viable alternative to actual implementation. We selected two different road layouts to test our proposal. Fig. 4(a) shows the area between Martin Luther King Blvd. and West Slauson Ave. in the city of Los Angeles (CA, USA), which has a very regular street layout similar to synthetic Manhattan-grid layouts. The street map around Paseo de la Castellana in the city of Madrid (Spain), shown in Fig. 4(b) , is an example of a European city with a more irregular layout. The scenarios were obtained from OpenStreetMap [24] , each one representing a 4-km 2 area. Vehicular mobility is generated with the CityMob for Roadmaps (C4R) tool, 1 which can import maps from OpenStreetMap and is based on SUMO [25] , which is a realistic open-source traffic simulation package. The microscopic mobility is modeled through the Krauss mobility model with some modifications to allow multilane behavior [26] . From a macroscopic viewpoint, our mobility simulations account for areas with different vehicle densities, ranging from 12.5 to 100 vehicles/km 2 . Since in a realistic urban environment the traffic is not uniformly distributed, being driven by points of interest that attract vehicles, we adopt the Downtown Model [27] to determine such points of attraction in the roadmaps and to derive the macroscopic traffic flows. The effect of traffic flow changes on the performance is negligible, since the dissemination time obtained in our simulations is too short to appreciate noticeable changes due to these changes that could modify the dynamic behavior of the simulation.
Simulations were carried out using the ns-2 simulator [28] , modified to include the IEEE 802.11p [15] standard to closely follow the upcoming WAVE standard. In terms of the physical layer, the data rate used for packet broadcasting is 6 Mbit/s, as this is the maximum rate for broadcasting in 802.11p. At the MAC layer, channel access priorities were implemented: four different access categories (ACs) provide different priority to application messages, where AC0 has the lowest and AC3 the highest priority. The simulator was also modified to make use of our Real Attenuation and Visibility (RAV) propagation model [29] , which increases the level of realism of the VANET simulations by accounting for real urban roadmaps and obstacles that have a strong influence over the wireless signal propagation. The RAV model is based on real-world measurements and accounts for attenuation and fading due to radio obstacles.
In each scenario, three warning-mode vehicles generate warning messages at a rate of 1 message/s, whereas the rest of the normal-mode vehicles act as relaying nodes for these messages. The vehicles in the simulation also broadcast onehop HELLO messages at a rate of 1 message/s to implement the neighbor position verification algorithm. In an urban environment where the maximum speed should not exceed 50 km/ 2 , the maximum distance traveled by vehicles is about 14 m, and thus, it is a reasonable assumption to generate verification messages at this rate to avoid saturation of the wireless channel. However, the scheme could be easily adapted to comply with standards such as the ETSI TS 102 637-2 [31] , in which the beacons are sent dynamically with frequencies between 1 and 10 Hz in dependence of the mobility of the sender vehicle. In this case, the CNPV information could be broadcast once per second, whereas the rest of the beacons would contain only the information required in each situation, making the verification mechanism compatible with these standards.
As for the time required by the operations of signing and verification that are part of the secure protocol, we took them into account. We set the time required for signing a DISCLOSURE message to 3 ms and that required for signature verification to 12 μs, assuming that an Intel Core i7-2670QM 2.2-GHz processor is used [32] . Note that only one signature per cycle time has to be generated by each node and that every cycle time one signature verification per neighbor has to be carried out.
We evaluate the following performance metrics of interest: the warning notification time, i.e., the time required by normal vehicles to receive a warning message sent by a warning-mode vehicle, and the percentage of blind vehicles, i.e., the percent- age of normal-mode vehicles that do not receive a warning message. We are also interested in assessing the overhead that CNPV induces in the network and the effect of different levels of ranging errors on the performance of the mechanism. All results represent the average of multiple executions with different random seeds and fall within a 95% confidence interval. Table I summarizes the parameter values used in our simulations.
A. Adversary Model
Simulations account for different percentages of adversarial vehicles, namely, 3%, 6%, and 9% of the total number of vehicles. This relatively high values are selected since we are interested in worst case scenarios where the number of adversaries could threaten the performance of the Warning Message Dissemination system. The nodes only have knowledge about their communication neighbors; they do not have global knowledge of the network, and a high percentage of adversaries is necessary to cover all the attacked area.
Attackers aim at reducing the performance of the warning message dissemination process by attracting the road safety data traffic but not forwarding the warning messages received. To that end, they announce false positions so as to exploit the vulnerabilities of the eMDR and UV-CAST algorithms, as detailed next.
In the case of the eMDR algorithm, vehicles closer to roadmap junctions have an advantage over their neighbors since they have the highest chances of reaching new areas of the topology. Hence, a simple attack that would reduce the performance of warning message dissemination using this algorithm consists in announcing bogus positions very close to the junction coordinates. Detecting a neighbor in a more appropriate location, all other vehicles will refrain from forwarding the message. Some time later, another node might forward the message, although it is in a less favorable position, since the integrity of the system has been compromised. Regarding the UV-CAST protocol, the SCF task is performed by boundary vehicles, and a vehicle that is not located in the vertices of the boundary polygon will not be assigned this task. Hence, vehicles advertising false positions relatively far from their actual position will obtain advantage over their neighbors, since they will be located with higher probability in the boundary area. Fewer neighbors will be assigned the datacarrying task, reducing the chances that the warning message reaches new areas of the urban scenario.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
Here, the performance of the CNPV protocol is evaluated. We rely on simulation since an accurate representation of both 1) vehicular mobility and 2) CNPV protocol operation is required. Unfortunately, those two aspects are nearly impossible to abstract into an analytical model without oversimplifying the system, which would yield results of little significance, as shown, e.g., in [33] . For instance, previous works presenting analytical models of node mobility and vehicle-to-vehicle connectivity [34] or message dissemination [35] have limited their scope to extremely simplified scenarios (a highway road section or a regular grid) and to dynamics over very short time intervals, in addition to making unrealistic assumptions on car movement (e.g., each road lane corresponds to a fixed speed, and lane changes occur with known probabilities). However, the performance of the message dissemination scheme and the secure positioning techniques of CNPV are strongly dependent on the underlying node mobility, which should thus be represented in a very realistic way, and are too complex to be mathematically tractable via, e.g., Markovian analysis.
We first study the effect of adversarial nodes on the performance of the dissemination process when eMDR and UV-CAST are used in their legacy version, as well as in combination with the CNPV protocol we propose. Then, we assess the overhead induced by the use of the CNPV protocol and the effect of different levels of ranging error on the performance of the system. Finally, we study the influence of high vehicle densities in urban scenarios.
A. Securing Warning Message Dissemination
Figs. 5 and 6 show the percentage of vehicles reached by the warning message over time in the Madrid map, under different vehicle densities and percentages of adversaries. As we can observe, the legacy UV-CAST scheme is noticeably affected, even when a low percentage of attackers are present in the environment: When CNPV is used, the number of informed vehicles grows by 15%-20% for most warning notification times. The differences observed when CNPV is used or not tend to grow with increasing vehicle densities, which implies that attackers can more easily slow down the overall process in the presence of a dense vehicular network. Regarding the two mechanisms used by the UV-CAST algorithm, the SCF task is mainly inhibited when adversaries announce false positions. Results show that this is a very important mechanism to reach new areas of the roadmap, and hence, the UV-CAST algorithm is greatly affected by the presence of adversaries.
The eMDR algorithm is more resistant, in general, to adversaries trying to thwart it. As shown in Fig. 5 , when the vehicle density remains low, there are not enough vehicles to cover most of the junctions of the topology, and hence, the warning message reception probability is only reduced by 10% at each time instant. However, the effect of the adversary nodes is more evident when the vehicle density increases, since the area occupied by vehicles is larger. This effect is more evident in Fig. 6(b) , where we can see an important performance decrease when the security mechanism is not enabled.
To better understand the impact of vehicle density, Fig. 7 shows the evolution of the warning dissemination process in Los Angeles when the percentage of adversaries is fixed at 6%. Again, we observe a similar tendency for both dissemination schemes with respect to the Madrid scenario. The UV-CAST algorithm is very sensitive to adversaries in the environment, and there is a uniform performance reduction in all the tested scenarios, independent of the chosen vehicle density. However, the eMDR scheme is able to support up to 200 vehicles (50 vehicles/km 2 ) without significant performance loss. Whenever the vehicle density exceeds this threshold, the number of adversary vehicles is enough to degrade the dissemination process, making the selection of the optimal forwarding vehicles unfeasible. We must remember that this selection uses the information of the road topology to choose those vehicles with a better line-of-sight with respect to the streets (i.e., the closest to the center of the junctions), and adversary vehicles sending this information will affect all the vehicles in the proximity of the junction. As the number of adversaries rises, the number of occupied junctions increases, and the selection of forwarding vehicles is not optimal.
We already proved how the UV-CAST algorithm is greatly affected by the presence of even a low percentage of adversary nodes. It would be more interesting to study how the eMDR algorithm is affected in a wider variety of scenario. Table II contains the average simulation results for the eMDR scheme in all the configurations tested in the Madrid scenario, for the metrics of blind vehicles not receiving warning messages after 120 s, and the time required to inform at least 50% and 75% of the vehicles in the scenario, which is also called the Warning Notification Time. It is noticeable that when the security scheme for neighbor position verification is enabled, we achieve better results in all the tested scenarios and for all the metrics selected: The gain in the values of some of the metrics is higher than 60%. In general, we observe how, by increasing the percentage of adversary vehicles per warning vehicle (column "% Adv."), the scheme considerably reduces its performance, particularly for high vehicle densities. Furthermore, under high vehicle density, the scheme reduces the percentage of blind vehicles (by up to 50%) as well as the time needed to inform 75% of the vehicles. The latter improves from 10.4% when simulating 100 vehicles to 61.1% for 400 vehicles in the best case. This confirms the tendency observed for the eMDR algorithm in the rest of tested scenarios.
B. CNPV Protocol Overhead
We define the overhead as the average ratio of wireless traffic received by a vehicle due to the CNPV protocol, in terms of HELLO and DISCLOSURE messages. More formally, the overhead is computed as
where BytesReceived CNPV (i) are the bytes of traffic induced by CNPV and received by vehicle i, BytesReceived total (i) are the total bytes received by vehicle i, and N is the total number of vehicles in the system. As shown in Fig. 8 , the packet overhead is less than 8% of the total traffic in all the tested scenarios when 3% of adversaries are considered and less than 10% when the simulation accounts for 9% of adversaries. There is a slight increase in the overhead produced by the security mechanism as the percentage of adversarial nodes grows, since there are fewer vehicles forwarding warning messages, and the amount of relative traffic due to HELLO messages is higher. Fig. 8 . Average overhead due to the security mechanism with (a) 3%, (b) 6%, and (c) 9% of adversaries. We can observe how the percentage becomes higher when the UV-CAST algorithm is used: 5%-10% of traffic for UV-CAST compared with 1%-4% for eMDR; notice that this difference is mainly due to the lower number of messages produced by UV-CAST compared with the eMDR scheme. In addition, in regular maps such as in Los Angeles, the ratio between HELLO messages and warning messages increases as the vehicle density grows, due to the superlinear increase in the number of one-hop neighbors with respect to the total number of vehicles. Conversely, the overhead does not have a monotonic trend in irregular maps such as in Madrid, where connectivity is sparser.
In general, the additional traffic generated by the security scheme is low compared with the warning message dissemination scheme to which it gives support. The small onehop HELLO messages used by the CNPV mechanism occupy less bandwidth than the large warning message that is not limited to one-hop interactions.
To better understand the efficiency of the dissemination algorithms studied, Fig. 9 shows the average percentage of duplicate warning messages received by each vehicle in Madrid, compared with the total number of warning messages received. As we can see, the amount of duplicate messages is higher when using the eMDR algorithm, where 60%-80% messages received are duplicated. However, even if this may be considered inefficient compared with the UV-CAST scheme, which achieves 40%-50% of duplicates, the results show how eMDR is able to inform more vehicles in less time, making it particularly suitable to deliver critical information. UV-CAST could be useful to disseminate noncritical information with decent performance and little resource usage. Finally, if we disable the verification mechanism, the percentage of duplicate messages also decreases. Malicious nodes are able to reduce the overall warning message traffic, thus reducing the amount of informed vehicles and increasing the time required to notify the affected vehicles.
C. Influence of ToF Ranging Errors on CNPV Performance
The localization obtained by means of the ToF-based RF ranging technique is not completely accurate. Depending on the frequency selected, the specific interfaces, and the environment, we may find different levels of ranging errors that could affect the performance of the security mechanism developed.
Lanzisera et al. [36] performed different experiments using several frequency ranges around the 2.4-GHz band, including methods for reducing error from clock offset and multipath propagation implemented on prototype hardware. In this scenario, the maximum localization error found was 24 m using the frequency of 2405 MHz, whereas for the rest of the frequencies, the maximum error was under 20 m, with an average error of 3 m. The error registered showed a Gaussian distribution, which means that the probability of error over 10 m is less than 10%.
Sikora and Groza [37] tested this ranging technique in street scenarios with and without obstacles, such as vehicles, trees, and other urban structures, using commercial equipment working in the 2.4-GHz band. The error registered were about 4-10 m without obstacles and 5-15 m in the presence of obstacles with typical standard deviations below 0.4 m. Using the data from existing works as a reference, we studied the effect of ranging errors on the performance of the CNPV mechanism used jointly with the tested warning message dissemination algorithms. We simulated different levels of maximum error: from 10 m, as used in the previous simulations presented, to 40 m, representing conditions with extreme error values if we compare with the empirical results using this ranging technology. These values correspond to the variable r in the CNPV algorithm, representing the precision of the ranging mechanism.
Figs. 10 and 11 show the results obtained using the scenario of Madrid simulating 200 and 400 vehicles, i.e., 50 and 100 vehicles/km 2 . As shown, the performance of the warning dissemination process in an adversarial environment is noticeably influenced by the presence of ranging errors; however, it is only really remarkable when the error levels are very high (over 30 m) and when the percentage of attackers exceeds 6%. The tendency in all the situations tested is the same; the warning notification time and the percentage of uninformed nodes increase as the error level grows, but there are no major differences when the maximum error is 30 or 40 m.
If we compare the dissemination algorithms, i.e., eMDR and UV-CAST, it is also noteworthy that the eMDR scheme outperforms UV-CAST in all the scenarios, even when the ranging error levels are the highest. However, the influence of ranging errors on the performance of UV-CAST are almost independent on the percentage of adversarial nodes, whereas eMDR becomes less efficient as the number of attackers increases. This is particularly visible in Fig. 11(c) , where the performance of eMDR reduces up to 20% comparing between 10 and 50 m of maximum ranging error.
D. Performance Under High Vehicle Density
In realistic urban environments, the vehicle density could increase far over the threshold of 100 vehicles/km 2 , producing scenarios prone to cause broadcast storms due to the number of vehicles directly connected. The higher probability of packet collisions in the shared channel under these conditions may reduce the effectiveness of the position verification mechanism. Hence, we will study the effects of dense environments on the designed system. We performed new simulations accounting for higher vehicle densities. Specifically, we tested with 400 vehicles/km 2 and 800 vehicles/km 2 , representing traffic jam conditions in dense cities. Due to the limitations of the ns-2 simulator, we obtained a smaller area of the Madrid map covering 1 km 2 where the new simulations could be performed without excessively increasing simulation time (see Fig. 12 ). We decided to test new values for the percentage of adversary nodes to observe their effect when combined with higher vehicular densities. In particular, we obtained the results simulating with 1%, 3%, and 9% of adversaries. Figs. 13 and 14 show the simulation results in this scenario.
As shown, the performance reduction when the verification mechanism is disabled is not as noticeable as it was under lower densities. The main reason of this effect is that the parts of the algorithm that are inhibited by the actions of the malicious nodes, i.e., rebroadcast in junctions using eMDR and SCF using UV-CAST, are mainly useful for densities under 100 vehicles/km 2 since they are designed for low-congested urban environments. As vehicle density increases, the importance of these mechanisms in the notification of additional vehicles is less important, and the other parts of the algorithm become more useful, reducing the negative effect of the adversaries.
Regarding the trend observed in these new results, it remains the same when compared with those obtained under low-medium density. The eMDR algorithm achieves better results than UV-CAST in all the simulations, and it only experiences performance drops under the highest percentages of adversaries. The performance reduction is hardly noticeable for 1% of adversary nodes, increasing as the number of adversaries increases. The performance of the UV-CAST algorithm is reduced by about 5%-10%, even when the number of adversaries is low, proving that the efficiency of the verification system is maintained, even in congested environments.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a proactive cooperative mechanism for neighbor position verification based on the information interchanged among one-hop neighbors. Our CNPV protocol is easily adaptable to different warning message dissemination schemes that make use of the neighbor information to decide the most appropriate forwarding scheme in VANETs. CNPV allows verifying the position of the neighbors before deciding the next forwarding vehicle, favoring the dissemination process and limiting the number of vehicles that do not receive the warning messages.
We evaluated the performance of the CNPV protocol by coupling it with two dissemination algorithms, i.e., eMDR and UV-CAST, showing how 1) the presence of adversary nodes affects the warning message dissemination performance in urban scenarios and 2) CNPV can help reduce the impact of adversarial users in the vehicular network. When applied in conjunction to the eMDR algorithm, we see how this dissemination scheme supports a high percentage of attackers if the vehicle density is low; however, increasing the number of vehicles in the area allows adversary nodes to occupy the best positions of the road topology, noticeably reducing the performance of the dissemination process. When applying our approach to the UV-CAST scheme, we observe that it is particularly sensitive to vehicles announcing false positions, since the SCF approach adopted to reach new areas in disconnected regimes is only performed by boundary vehicles. A vehicle sending false information can easily become the boundary vehicle, avoiding vehicles with a more favorable position to assume this role. Overall, our results show how CNPV improves the performance of the dissemination process in adversarial environments by up to 50% in terms of warning notification time and percentage of uninformed nodes.
